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Current Problems With Venue In Georgia
by C.Ronald Ellington
Georgia's first constitution, the
Constitution of 1777, contained
a section providing that "all matters in dispute between contending parties, residing in different
counties, shall be tried in the
county where the defendant resides, except in cases of real
estate, which shall be tried in
the county where such real
estate lies."' The practice of
specifying rules of venue in the
constitution thus dates from the
very beginning of our state and
has been repeated and expanded
in subsequent constitutional revisions. The
Constitution of
1798, for example, added the rule
that joint obligors, residing in
different counties, may be sued
in the county of residence of
either.2 The Constitution of 1861

included an explicit provision
governing the place of venue for
equitable actions," and with the
adoption of the Constitution of
1868, 4 all the present-day rules
of venue had been fixed as part
of the fundamental law of the
state."
There were, notwithstanding
the hierarchy of the venue rules
in our structure of laws, some
early objections from members
of the Bar that these venue rules
were being applied in an overly
technical way that worked to
defeat, rather than further, the
cause of justice. These objections were met in 1906 by the
firm rejoinder of Justice Lumpkin that "the right to be sued in
the proper county is not merely
technical, but is a substantial,
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constitutional right."6 This statement by Justice Lumpkin still
aptly describes tile prevailing judicial attitude toward Georgia's
venue requirements.
On the other hand, over the
years many of the rules governing trial practice and procedure
in Georgia have been modernized and revised in keeping with
contemporary needs and concerns.7 In 1966 the General Assembly adopted the Civil Practice Act, Rule 1 of which proclaims that its provisions "shall
be construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."' Two
important provisions in the CPA
for promoting judicial economy
and efficiency are Rule 14 governing impleader and Rule 13

dealing with counterclaims.
Impleader, or third-party practice, is the procedure by which
a defendant can bring into the
action one that he claims is liable to him for all or part of
plaintiff's claim against him.
Similarly, Rule 13 seeks to
promote the joinder of claims to
expedite the resolution of all the
controversies between the parties in one suit to avoid a circuity
of actions and multiple litigation.
To these ends Rule 13(h) authorizes the joinder of additional
parties for the purpose of adjudicating a counterclaim that has
been asserted to dispose of an
action in its entirety and to grant
complete relief to all the concerned parties.'
While the Georgia appellate
courts have been receptive to
the advantages offered by impleader and counterclaims,10
they have rigorously and unduly
adhered to the constitutional
mandate that in civil actions a
defendant is entitled to be sued
in the county of his residence,
unless the venue for the action
is controlled by one of the specified exceptions contained in the
Constitution.
Viewed in the abstract, perhaps, this ancient rule of venue
is easy to apply and seems to
strike a sensible balance between
the interests of plaintiffs and defendants, although the modern
trend is to give the plaintiff a
wider choice of places of venue
by allowing civil actions to be
brought as well where "a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim
occurred."'" However, in practice the results dictated by venue
concerns have often been less
than sensible. The availability
of obtaining venue for the action
against the defendant is as important as securing the requisite
personal jurisdiction. And, unfortunately, the strict application
of Georgia's constitutional venue
rules has seriously undermined
the effectiveness of the CPA
rules allowing impleader and
counterclaims. Given the scarcity of judicial resources and the

often publicized backlog in trial
court calendars, the time has
come for a critical assessment
of the interaction of venue and
the rules authorizing impleader
and counterclaims in the CPA.
Impleader and the Legacy of
Register v. Stone
In the well-known case of
Register v. Stone's Independent
Oil Distributions, Inc. 1 2 the supreme court held that venue
must be independently established before third-party defendants could be impleaded under
Rule 14. The factual situation
in Register illustrates and typifies the kind of case that impleader was devised to handle;
yet, the Georgia venue requirements, as construed by the court,
barred its use.
In Register the plaintiff, a Mrs.
Bailey, commenced an action in
the Dodge Superior Court seeking damages from various defendants who she alleged were
jointly responsible for a multiple
vehicle collision that injured her
husband. Although some of the
defendants resided in counties
other than Dodge, venue was
proper against all the co-defendants in the forum for the purpose of plaintiff's original action
because joint tortfeasors may be
sued in the county of residence
of any one defendant. 13 However, after filing suit plaintiff
amended her complaint to strike
Register as a defendant. Stone,
one of the originally named defendants, then sought to implead
Register as a third-party defendant in the main action by contending that Register was liable
through contribution to Stone for
a pro rata share of any verdict
and judgment returned in favor
of the plaintiff against Stone.
Register moved to dismiss the
third-party complaint on the
ground that as a resident of
Laurens County, venue could not
properly be had over him in
Dodge County, the forum of the
principal suit.
The supreme court upheld the
third-party defendant's venue
objections. Although recognizing that a joint tortfeasor's right

to contribution could be procedurally enforced through an impleader action, the supreme court
ruled that such an action was in
the nature of an independent
suit that could be maintained
only in the county of the residence of the alleged joint tortfeasor."4 This conclusion, reasoned the court, was demanded
because under the constitution
a defendant is entitled to be sued
in the county of his residence
and a procedural rule in the CPA
could not expand the venue of
such actions."5
The result in Register has been
both criticized 6 and defended
as unavoidable. 7 Certainly, it is
unfortunate and should have
been avoided if possible. And,
Judge Eberhardt, writing for the
court of appeals in the case below, believed that it could be
avoided.'" The approach followed by the court of appeals
was to view the impleader action
as an ancillary proceeding closely connected with and arising
out of the dispute in the main
action. Hence, the need to establish venue independently was
obviated. Under the approach
adopted by the court of appeals,
the venue for the third-party action was simply predicated on
the venue established in the main
action.
This, of course, is the approach
followed in federal practice
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where both subject-matter jurisdiction and venue are treated as
ancillary in third-party actions.' 9
To say, as the supreme court did
in Register, that the federal cases
are inapposite because the federal jurisdictional and venue
standards are different misses
the mark somewhat. Even in federal practice, impleader is not
deemed to expand the court's
jurisdiction. Rather, impleader is
deemed to warrant the use of the
court's powers of ancillary jurisdiction, i.e., a judicially developed concept based on the premise that a court which has jurisdiction over a case can, as an
incident of disposing of the case
in its entirety, decide other matters raised by the case over
which it would not have jurisdiction or venue if they were independently presented. Thus, because the defendant's right of
action against the third-party
under Rule 14 must be based on
the same aggregate core of facts
that constitutes plaintiff's claim,
the use of ancillary jurisdiction
enables the court having jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim to
determine the third-party claim
springing out of the same core
of facts without satisfying addi20
tional

jurisdictional

grounds.

Therefore, by reversing the court
of appeals and requiring that
venue be independently established, the supreme court in
Register appears to have renounced the judicial power to
exercise ancillary jurisdiction, in
the face of Georgia's constitutional venue rules.
Since 1971 when Register was
decided, Georgia appellate courts
have carried out both the letter
and the spirit of its mandate."'
Two recent cases further underscore the current venue-related
problems of impleader. In one,
the court of appeals extended
the principle of Register, bypassing an opportunity to ameliorate
its harsh rigors. In the second
case, however, the court of appeals sanctioned a sleight-ofhand method of avoiding the pitfalls of Register.
In Louisville & Nashville R.R.
v. Bush,22 one Hogan, the driver

of an automobile, and Bush, a
guest passenger, were injured in
a car-train collision in DeKalb
County. Hogan, then a resident
of DeKalb County, filed suit
there against the railroad for her
injuries. At the same time, Bush,
the passenger, also filed suit in
DeKalb County against the defendant railroad for her injuries.
Since both the Hogan suit and
the Bush suit arose out of the
same collision, the cases were
ordered consolidated for trial.
Thereafter, the trial court entered an order in Bush's law suit
granting leave to the defendant
railroad to file and have served
a third-party complaint against
Hogan in which the railroad
sought contribution alleging that
Hogan as the driver of the automobile was jointly liable because
of her gross negligence in driving
into the path of the oncoming
train. Hogan moved successfully
to dismiss the third-party complaint against her since she had
moved to Gwinnett County between the time of filing her complaint in DeKalb County and the
time the railroad's third-party
complaint was served on her.
The cases continued to trial, and
the jury found for the railroad
in the Hogan suit and for the
passenger in the Bush suit. The
railroad appealed and enumerated as one error the dismissal
for lack of venue of its thirdparty claim against Hogan.
The court of appeals held,
rather woodenly, that since Hogan was a resident of Gwinnett
County at the time the thirdparty complaint was served
against her, the rule in Register
precluded the impleader against
her in DeKalb County. The court
might have avoided this result
by finding that Hogan had
waived venue for the purpose of
the Bush suit by filing her own
complaint against the railroad in
DeKalb County. Although it is
well established that by filing
suit a party does waive venue as
to all matters arising out of the
action brought by that party
[such as counterclaims or separate actions to enjoin its prosecution 23 ), the court refused to hold
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that a party by filing suit in a
county waives venue as to a
separate law suit between different parties in that county
even though both actions arise
from the same events and have
24
been consolidated for trial..
Although the railroad still presumably can institute an action
in Gwinnett County against Hogan to seek contribution for the
recovery against it in the Bush
suit, it would have been far more
economical and expeditious to
have determined the rights of all
the parties in one consolidated
trial before one judge and jury
in DeKalb County, the scene of
the accident.
In Ogden Equipment Co. v.
Talmadge Farms, Inc., 25 the
court of appeals sanctioned one
ingenious way to circumvent the
Register problem. Here, General
Electric Credit Corporation filed
suit in Fulton County against
Talmadge Farms, Inc., a resident
of Henry County. Talmadge
Farms filed its answer without
asserting its venue objections
and then filed a third-party complaint against Ogden Equipment
Co., a resident of Fulton County.
Ogden moved to dismiss the
third-party complaint contending
that Talmadge Farms could not
waive venue so as to prejudice
the right of third parties in accordance with Ga. Code Ann. §
24-112.""
The court held, however, that
this statute only barred waivers
that prejudiced the legal rights
of third persons and was not
violated by a party's mere inconvenience and expense in defending an impleader action expressly allowed by the CPA. Although General Electric and Talmadge Farms had orally agreed
on Fulton County as the forum
for the original action in order
to allow Talmadge Farm's thirdparty complaint against Ogden, 7
venue was proper as to the original defendant, Talmadge Farms,
by consent and as to Ogden, the
third-party defendant, because it
was a resident of Fulton County.
Thus, it seems that only if the
plaintiff is cooperative and will
(Continued on page 105)
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VENUE (Continued from page 73)
file suit by prearrangement in
the county of the residence of
the party sought to be impleaded, can the economies of
third-party practice be had in
Georgia courts where the thirdparty plaintiff and the thirdparty defendant are residents of
different counties.
Counterclaims and the
"Next-Door" Plaintiff
When a plaintiff who resides
in another county files suit in
the county of the defendant's
residence, the plaintiff as a general rule is deemed to waive his
venue objections to the forum
county so that the defendant can
assert counterclaims against him
there. 28 A problem can arise,
however, when additional parties must be brought in for the
purpose of deciding defendant's
counterclaim. In federal courts
the requirements of subject-matter jurisdiction and venue for
such additional parties are handled by the concept of ancillary
jurisdiction.29 Thus, persons
brought into an action under
Rule 13(h) as parties to a compulsory (but not a permissive)
counterclaim come within the ancillary jurisdiction of the court
because the compulsory counterclaim involves the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff's original action and is closely connected with it. In this way
many related claims can be settled within the scope of one action.
In Georgia, however, venue
requirements loom large as the
30
case of Pemberton v. Purifoy
shows. In Pemberton a resident
of Floyd County, injured in a
multiple automobile collision,
brought an action in the Superior
Court of
Whitfield
County
against the defendant, a resident
of Whitfield County. The defendant then asserted a counterclaim seeking damages arising
out of the same collision against
the plaintiff and two others, the
driver and the owner of a third
automobile, involved in the accident. These last two parties
were, like the plaintiff, residents

of Floyd County. Accordingly,
the court held that venue was
improper in the Whitfield Superior Court as to the counterclaim filed against the additional
two parties. While the plaintiff,
by voluntarily instituting the suit
in Whitfield County, consented
to the jurisdiction of that court
for the purposes of his suit, the
plaintiff's action could not waive
the venue objections of others;
nor, did instituting the suit in
Whitfield
County make the
plaintiff a "resident" of that
county so that the constitutional
venue rule that allows joint tortfeasors to be sued in the county
of residence of either would become applicable.
Moreover, the supreme court
has even found that venue prevented the assertion of a counterclaim against the plaintiff who
originally chose the forum for
the litigation. In Buford v. Buford31 a wife filed a complaint
against her husband in the Superior Court of Jones County,
the county of his residence,
seeking custody of their minor
child, alimony, and other relief.
The husband then filed a counterclaim in the same action seeking divorce and custody of the
child. The wife moved to strike
the counterclaim for divorce for
lack of venue since the Georgia
Constitution, Ga. Code Ann. §
2-4901 (rev. 1973), fixes the venue of divorce cases in the county
in which the defendant resides,
if the defendant is a Georgia
resident. Because the wife was
a resident of Bibb County, the
court agreed that the counterclaim for divorce could not be
asserted against her in Jones
County even though she had instituted an action for alimony
and child custody there. Thus,
the supreme court ruled that the
venue requirements of the constitution in divorce cases could
not be waived by a party's filing
suit outside the county of his
residence. Why the constitutional rule fixing venue in divorce
cases cannot be waived just like
the rule that a defendant must
be sued in the county of his residence was not explained.
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Pemberton and Buford highlight the unfortunate restrictions
that venue has placed on the use
of counterclaims. Similar venue
constraints probably also surround the use of cross-claims in
Rule 13 although no reported
case has yet dealt with this issue. Thus, if A sues B and C as
joint tortfeasors in the county of
B's residence, venue is proper
as to the original claim. However, based on Register, Bush,
and Pemberton, it would appear
that B could not cross-claim
against C, if C were not a resident of the forum, even though
B's claim against C involved the
same transaction or
occurrence
32
as the main claim.
The Remedy:
Constitutional Revision
The obvious deficiencies in
Georgia practice and procedure
caused by the constitutional
venue requirements have not
gone unnoticed on the court. In
Buford, for example, Justice Jordan joined by Justice Ingram decried the uneconomical expenditure of judicial resources necessitated by that decision and
called for amending the constitutional rules to allow counter3
claims in such cases".
And, in
Smith v. Foster, 34 a case in which
the defendant unsuccessfully
sought to use the Rule 19 joinder
of party provisions to overcome
the venue barrier to impleader,
Justice Jordan again warned that
"Georgia's hodge-podge constitutional and statutory venue provisions have long needed a revision in light of modern day
requirements."'35
Although a creditable argument could be made that all the
problems enumerated above
could be remedied simply by judicial acceptance of a concept
of ancillary jurisdiction, old attitudes die hard and nothing short
of amending the constitution to
authorize the General Assembly
to prescribe new rules of venue
by statute may suffice. Without
a constitutional change it is
doubtful that the General Assembly acting by statute could
wholly cure the deficiencies al-

though it made at least a step
in the right direction during the
1975 session in expanding the
venue of actions at law against
corporations. Ga. Code Ann. §
22-5301 which provided permissible places of venue for contract
and tort actions against corporations in addition to the county
where the registered office was
located was repealed by 1975 Ga.
Laws, p. 583, effective July 1,
1975. Basically, the amendment
restated and consolidated the
existing venue rules for corporations under Ga. Code Ann. § 22404.3r However, in connection
with the rules for tort actions, a
change was made. New section
22-404(d) now provides that a
corporation, in addition to the
county of its registered office,
"shall be deemed to reside and
may be sued for damages because of torts, wrong or injury
done, in the county where the
cause of action originated, if the
corporation transacts business in
that county. ' 37 The former rule
in § 22-5301 did not contain this
"transacts business" proviso but
rather required that the corporation have an agent, agency or
place of business there before it
could be served in the county
where the cause of action arose.
Although the measure of this
change is unclear and must await
future case-by-case development
to determine the level of activities necessary to satisfy the
"transacts business" test, the import of the change is presumably
to expand the availability of
venue in tort actions against corporations. Thus, it should be possible to show, for example, that
a corporation was "transacting
business" by operating a delivery
truck in the county where the
accident occurred even though
it did not have an agent, agency
or place of business in the county at the time process38 was attempted to be served.
It has generally been trought
that while the General Assembly
could fix alternative places of
venue for actions against corporations,3 9 as the legislature did
in enacting Ga. Code Ann. 22404, it could not constitutionally

dent Oil Distrib., Inc., 122 Ga. App.
335 (1970), rev'd, 227 Ga. 123 (1971).
19. See 6 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1444
(1971).
20. Id. at § 1444, at 220.
21. One clarification of the meaning of Register came in Shell v.
Watts, 229 Ga. 474 (1972). Assume
A sues B in X County. B then impleads C and D alleging them to be
joint tortfeasors. If either C or D is
a resident of X County, then venue
for the third-party action against
both is proper in accordance with GA.
CODE ANN. § 2-4904 (1972) which allows joint tortfeasors to be sued in
the county of residence of either.
22. 131 Ga. App. 405 (1974).
23. See note 29 infra.
24. Judge Eberhardt, joined by
Judges Bell, Hall, and Clark, dissented and would allow the impleader
since the suits had been consolidated
for trial. 131 Ga. App. at 410.
25. 132 Ga. App. 834, aff'd on
other grounds, 232 Ga. 614 (1974).
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31. 231 Ga. 9 (1973).
10. See, e.g., The Koppers Co. v.
32. In federal practice such crossParks, 120 Ga. App. 551 (1969)
claims come within the ancillary jur(impleader); Buffington v. McClelisdiction of the court and need not
land, 125 Ga. App. 153 (1971) (counpresent independent grounds of juristerclaim).
diction and venue. See 6 WRIGHT &
11. See American Law Institute,
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROStudy of the Division of Jurisdiction
CEDURE § 1433 (1971). However, anBetween State and Federal Courts §
cillary jurisdiction is apparently not
1303(a) (proposed) (1969). See genavailable for this purpose in Georgia.
erally Stevens, Venue Statutes: DiagFor an early, optimistic assessment of
nosis and Proposed Cure, 49 Mich. L.
the prospects for using counterclaims
Rev. 307 (1951).
and cross-claims under the Civil Prac12. 227 Ga. 123 (1971).
tice Act, see Norman, The Georgia
13. GA. CODE ANN. § 2-4904
Civil Practice Act: Counterclaims,
(1972).
Cross-Claims and Third-Party Prac14. 227 Ga. at 126.
tice, 4 GA. ST. B.J. 205, 215-16 (1967).
15. 227 Ga. at 125: "This title
33. Buford v. Buford, 231 Ga. 9,
shall not be construed to extend or
12 (1973) (concurring).
limit the jurisdiction of the courts
34. 230 Ga. 207 (1973).
or the venue of actions therein." See
35. 230 Ga. at 211 (dissenting).
GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-182.
36. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-404(b)
16. See Beaird & Ellington, Anremains unchanged in providing that
nual Survey of Georgia Law: Trial
for venue purposes a corporation is
Practice and Procedure, 25 MERCER L.
deemed to be a resident of the county
REv.. 265, 275-79 (1973); Comment,
where its registered office is fixed by
Georgia Civil Procedure-Impleading
its corporat- charter. New section 22of a Third-Party Defendant is an In404(c) was added and it now specidependent "Suit" that Must Satisfy
fied that a corporation shall also "be
the Venue Requirements of the Geordeemed to reside and may be sued on
gia Constitution, 8 GA. ST. B.J. 428
contracts in that county in which the
(1972).
contract sought to be enforced was
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made or is to be performed, if it has
GEORGIA PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5-10
an office and transacts business in
(4th ed. 1975).
that county." 1975 Ga. Laws, p. 583,
18. Register v. Stone's Indepen-

expand the places of venue for
individual natural persons.4 °
Thus, the only certain method
for expanding the places of venue for actions against individual
defendants lies in amending the
constitution.
Marshalling public concern and
support to alter the fundamental
law of the state to cure littleknown problems of venue will
not be easy. And, as Justice Cardozo's famous aphorism puts it:
"Not lightly to be vacated is the
verdict of quiescent years."4 1
Nevertheless, the Bar of Georgia
needs to move now to bring
about a general revision of our
venue rules.4 2
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588 (emphasis added). This provision
is identical to the one contained in
former GA. CODE ANN. § 22-5301.
37. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-404(d),
added by [1975] Ga. Laws 583, 588.
38. Compare Drake v. Chesser, 230
Ga. 148, 153-54 (1973), with Hunton
v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 134 Ga. 801,
804-06 (1975).
39. See Martin & Thompson, Inc.
v. Allen, 188 Ga. 42, 45 (1939).
40. See Youmans v. Hickman, 179
Ga. 684, 687-88 (1934).
41. Coler v. Corn Exchange Bank,
250 N.Y. 136, 164 N.E. 882 (1928).
42. The impediments caused by
the rules of venue to the effective use
of impleader and counterclaims represent only a few of the venue-related
problems for Georgia practice and
procedure. Statutes governing the
venue of specific actions are scattered
throughout the Code. See Note, Venue
In Georgia: Problems and Proposals,
9 GA. ST. B.J. 254 (1972). Issues still
arise over what constitutes a "case
respecting title to land" for the purposes of GA. CODE ANN. § 2-4902. See
Hawkins v. Pierotti, 232 Ga. 631
(1974). And, even the 1975 legislative change in GA. CODE ANN. § 22404(d) did not go far enough and
remove the distinction pointed out in
Etowah Milling Co. v. Crenshaw, 116
Ga. 406 (1904), between alternative
places of venue allowable in actions
against corporations seeking money
damages at law and those actions
seeking equitable relief. Hence, a
careful, thorough revision of the venue rules in Georgia is needed.
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STATE BAR MEETINGS
1975

November 21 - Board of Governors, Lake Lanier Islands
December 3-5 - Midyear Meeting, Atlanta
INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
PROGRAMS
1975

October 16-17

Civil Evidence with Emphasis on the New Federal

-

Rules, Lake Lanier Islands
October 28-30 October 29-31-

14th Workshop for Juvenile Court Judges, Athens
15th Seminar for District Attorneys, Athens

October 29-31

-

13th Seminar for Georgia Trial Judges, Athens

November 6-7

-

Creditors' Rights & Bankruptcy, Savannah

November 13-14

-

Creditors' Rights & Bankruptcy, Unicoi

December 11-12

-

Creditors' Rights & Bankruptcy, Atlanta
1976

January 8-10 - 12th Bridge-the-Gap, Atlanta
January 23 - Real Estate IV, Augusta
January 30 - Real Estate IV, Callaway Gardens
February 6- Real Estate IV, Atlanta
February 27-28 - 21st Estate Planning Institute for Atorneys,
Trust Officers, Life Underwriters & Accountants, Athens

THE BICENTENNIAL YEAR
The Editorial Board will be meeting soon to plan for participation
next year in the bicentennial celebration. We would like to have
the benefit of your suggestions as to topics which you consider appropriate for inclusion in the Journal. If you recommend a topic,
please let us know if you are willing to write the article yourself or
can suggest someone else as the author. Write Editor, Georgia State
Bar Journal, Fulton National Bank Bldg., Atlanta, GA 30303.
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